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Policy Watch
Trade Adjustment Assistance
Katherine Baicker and M. Marit Rehavi

This feature contains short articles on topics that are currently on the agendas
of policymakers, thus illustrating the role of economic analysis in illuminating
current debates. Suggestions for future columns and comments on past ones
should be sent to C. Eugene Steuerle, c/o Journal of Economic Perspectives, The Urban
Institute, 2100 M Street NW, Washington, D.C. 20037.

The Evolution of Trade Adjustment Assistance
The Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002 profoundly changed the
nature and scope of U.S. policy for addressing dislocations of workers caused by
trade. First, the legislation will potentially double the number of TAA recipients
and more than triple the total cost of the program to almost $2 billion annually,
making it a much more important component of the patchwork of programs
serving the unemployed (Congressional Budget Office, 2002). Second, it introduces new elements such as wage insurance and health credits into a program that
had previously included primarily only training and cash benefits. The addition of
these benefits creates both the opportunity for gains from greater coordination and
the potential for costly distortions and serves as a testing ground for the broader use
of such provisions. Although the program still covers only a small (and peculiarly
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selected) fraction of the unemployed, these changes affect the incentives faced by
many workers and may have far-reaching consequences in health and labor markets.
To put these changes in context, it is useful to begin with a brief history of
trade adjustment assistance. Trade adjustment assistance (TAA) was formally introduced in the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 when it was used “to compensate
workers for tariff cuts under the Kennedy Round of multilateral negotiations”
(Feenstra and Lewis, 1994, p. 217) and other liberalizations. Similar provisions to
compensate workers displaced by trade were also included in the CanadianAmerican Auto Agreement, the Manpower Development and Training Act of 1962
and the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964 (Richardson, 1982). TAA thus aimed to
serve both economic and political goals, decreasing political resistance to new trade
agreements and smoothing the cost of frictional unemployment by providing
income support and retraining as workers moved from shrinking to growing
sectors.
The 1962 version of trade adjustment assistance, however, had extremely
limited eligibility and benefits; in the first seven years, no applicants were certified
for benefits, and more than half of applicants were denied benefits in the early
1970s (Richardson, 1982). The Trade Act of 1974 increased the generosity of TAA
benefits and expanded eligibility, and the Department of Labor loosened the
criteria for the certification of firm eligibility, creating the modern TAA program.
Workers laid off from firms certified by the Department of Labor to have been
adversely affected by trade were eligible for retraining and for 52 weeks of cash
assistance beyond that provided by the unemployment insurance program. In 1976,
the first full year of operation under the new law, TAA covered 62,000 workers at
a cost of $79 million.
By the early 1980s, concerns arose about the targeting and growing cost of the
trade adjustment assistance program. A 1980 expansion had led to coverage of
532,000 workers at a cost of $1.6 billion (U.S. House of Representatives, 2003,
Table 6-3). By this time, TAA provided more generous cash assistance than unemployment insurance: TAA provided 70 percent of workers’ previous wages, compared with the 65 percent provided by unemployment insurance (Magee, 2001).
Despite the perception that TAA recipients were particularly disadvantaged in the
labor market, during the 1970s they did not appear to have more difficulty finding
reemployment than other unemployed workers. In fact, Magee (2001, p. 109) cites
studies showing that workers qualifying for TAA in this period were “more likely to
be recalled to their old jobs, less likely to switch industries, and did not have longer
unemployment spells than other displaced workers (Corson and Nicholson, 1981;
Richardson, 1982).”
In 1981, a set of amendments to the Trade Act of 1974 reduced TAA cash
benefits to the level of unemployment benefits and only provided cash assistance
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after unemployment benefits had been exhausted.1 The incoming Reagan administration tightened enforcement of the eligibility rules. As a result, by 1982, total
recipients of trade adjustment assistance dropped to 30,000 and costs dropped to
$103 million (U.S. House of Representatives, 2003, Table 6-3). The number of
recipients fell still lower as the economy expanded in the mid-1980s. A 1986
amendment added a job search requirement, and a 1988 amendment required
workers to participate in training in order to receive cash benefits. These amendments suggested a shift toward retraining workers and facilitating structural adjustment. During this period, the characteristics of qualifying workers also changed. In
contrast to research on the 1970s, Decker and Corson (1995) found that in the
1980s TAA recipients predominantly lost their jobs due to plant closings and were
therefore not likely to be recalled by their previous employer. They also found that
these workers had longer spells of unemployment and often had bigger drops in
reemployment wages relative to their previous jobs than other workers who exhausted their unemployment insurance benefits.
In 1993, as part of the push to secure the passage of the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA), Congress created NAFTA Transitional Adjustment
Assistance (NAFTA-TAA), a separate trade adjustment assistance program for
workers displaced by trade with or plant relocations to Canada or Mexico, and the
Clinton administration committed to assisting secondary workers (upstream suppliers and downstream finishers) through dislocated worker programs in the
Workforce Investment Act of 1998. Worker groups could simultaneously apply to
both traditional TAA and this new program—and 75 percent of NAFTA-TAA
certified workers were also included in TAA petitions (GAO, 2001)—although they
could receive benefits through only one program. Two of the most important
differences between TAA and NAFTA-TAA were that NAFTA-TAA covered secondary workers and did not require workers to prove that increases in imports caused
their job loss if they were displaced when a plant moved to Canada or Mexico.
Finally, the Secretary of Labor had discretion to waive training requirements in
TAA, while such waivers were not allowed in NAFTA-TAA.
The workers eligible for modern trade adjustment assistance were not a
representative cross-section of the labor force nor of the traded goods sector.
Table 1 shows the distribution across industries of workers who were certified for
assistance (but did not necessarily participate in the program) from 1975–2002,
compared to the current distribution of all workers and of imported goods. Since
1975, for example, almost 30 percent of TAA workers had been employed in motor
vehicles (although this fraction was much lower in the 1990s) and 20 percent in
apparel and textiles (35 percent in the 1990s), but these groups together represented less than 2 percent of workers in 2001, and motor vehicles and apparel
1
Before 1981, TAA supplemented unemployment insurance benefits (up to 75 percent of former
wages) and provided income support of up to 65 percent of former wages after unemployment
insurance benefits expired.
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Table 1
Workers Certified by Industry

Total
Motor vehicles
Apparel
Steel
Footwear
Electronics
Oil and gas
Fabricated metal products
Textiles
Other

Workers
certified
(1975–2002)

Fraction of total
labor force
working in
industry (2001)

Fraction of value of
U.S. imported goods
coming from each
industry (2002)

3,316,000
28.3%
18.6%
6.7%
4.4%
10.4%
5.7%
2.8%
3.6%
19.5%

132,213,000
1.3%
0.4%
0.2%
0.0%
1.5%
0.3%
1.1%
0.4%
94.8%

$653,359 million
14.5%
5.4%
1.1%
1.4%
5.4%
9.1%
1.4%

Note: Row category definitions vary slightly across columns.
Sources: Green Book (2003, Table 6-2); Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (2002, Table 603); BEA (具http://
www.bea.doc.gov/bea/newsrel/trad0703.xls典).

represented only 20 percent of the value of imported goods in 2002. Table 2 shows
that TAA recipients in 1990 –2000 were disproportionately female, less educated
and older, and Decker and Corson (1995) find that they were more highly paid
than other unemployed workers. Magee (2001) finds that unionized workers and
those displaced by trade from less-developed countries were more likely to have
their TAA petitions approved. Rogers (1998) finds that 58 percent of all unemployment spells end in recall, while in contrast, Marcal (2001) shows that less than
12 percent of TAA recipients were working for their former employer three years
after layoff. It is not clear, however, that TAA workers fare any worse than other
unemployed workers with the same demographic characteristics and employment
profiles (Irwin, 2002).
The primary focus of trade adjustment assistance has been on displaced
workers, and we will focus on that component of TAA, as well. However, the
program has also included small provisions for aiding firms and communities. The
Trade Expansion Act of 1962 also created a firm-based component of the TAA
program, designed to provide technical assistance and (until 1986) loans and loan
guarantees to firms adversely affected by increased imports (EDA, 2003). The
Department of Commerce established 12 regional TAA Centers in 1978 to help
firms with their TAA petitions and to help them develop business plans for dealing
with increased international competition. Firms whose business plans were approved were eligible for matching funds of up to $75,000 for technical assistance
with implementation, including market research, information technology consulting, product development and quality programs. Firm TAA also included industry
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Table 2
Worker Characteristics, 1999 –2000

Characteristic
Fraction male
Average age
Limited English
proficiency
Average hourly wage
Median tenure
Education
Less than high school
High school graduate
Some post–high school
College graduate
Unionization (1989/90)

TAA and N-TAA
participants

Unemployed or
dislocated workers

36%a
43a
12%a

52%b
34b

Total U.S. workforce
53%a
39c
8%g

$12.13 at separation
$10.31 at reemploymenta
7 years at separationa

2 years at separatione

$13.36 for production
workersa
3.5 yearsa

25%a
55%a
17%a
4%a
73%d

23%b
29%b
24%b
16%b
35%d

10%a
32%a
28%a
30%a
16%f

Sources: aGAO Report 01-988T (Table 1).
b
Refers to unemployed workers. Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (2000, Tables 646, 674, 678).
c
Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (2000, Tables 646, 712).
d
Marcal (2001). Refers to 1988 –1989 TAA recipients versus UI exhaustees.
e
CPS, 2000, Dislocated Worker Supplement. Refers to workers dislocated in past 3 years (mean tenures
is 4.9 years).
f
Statistical Abstract of the U.S. (2002, Table 628, for 1990).
g
CPS, 1995, Race and Ethnicity Supplement. Refers to fraction of employed workers reporting that they
understand English “not well” or “not at all.” Twelve percent of workers are immigrants.

grants, but no such grants have been given since 1995, and those allocated in the
early 1990s comprised less than 5 percent of the firm program’s budget (Congressional Research Service, 2000, Table 1). The 1993 NAFTA version of TAA also
created the Community Adjustment and Investment Program, which was intended
to provide assistance through grants and loan guarantees to communities significantly adversely affected by trade with Canada and Mexico and to firms providing
new jobs in those communities. The initial CAIP appropriation was $22.5 million,
with additional appropriations of $20 million. Only a handful of communities have
received aid through CAIP.

2002 Reauthorization of Trade Adjustment Assistance
By the early 2000s, trade adjustment assistance had evolved into a program that
provided generous support for a very limited number of workers. Worker groups of
three or more or their representatives could apply to the Department of Labor
to have workers in their firm certified as eligible for TAA benefits. Workers in
certified firms could then apply to receive up to 52 weeks of cash assistance beyond
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that provided by unemployment insurance, but were required to participate in a
training program to receive that support. Training was available for up to 104
weeks. The number of new workers receiving assistance varied from a low of
24,000 in 1998 to a high of 37,000 in 2002 (U.S. House of Representatives, 2003,
Table 6-3). In 2001, roughly 145,000 workers were “certified” as potentially eligible
for the program, and 33,000 took up benefits, which cost approximately $360
million (GAO, 2001). The average worker received $222 per week in cash benefits
for 31 weeks and $2,900 in training (almost $4,000 per worker actually enrolled)
(U.S. House of Representatives, 2003). Total spending on benefits for these workers was over $200 million, with some additional spending for job training and other
programs.
In 2002, the political climate was ripe for a grand reworking of trade adjustment assistance. The Bush administration badly wanted congressional renewal of
“trade promotion authority,” which would require Congress to hold an up-or-down
vote on new trade agreements without proposing amendments. However, the
economy had gone through a recession in 2001, and job growth had remained
stagnant in 2002. In exchange for trade promotion authority, Congress demanded
substantial expansions of the trade adjustment assistance program, resulting in the
Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002. Table 3 summarizes these
expansions, which we discuss in turn. They have the potential to change the
program from one designed primarily to provide political cover for trade agreements to one with much farther reaching effects.
Eligibility and Coverage
A much broader set of workers is now eligible for TAA. In the past, the main
criteria for displaced worker eligibility were that “workers have been totally or
partially laid off and that sales or productions have declined, and that increased
imports have contributed importantly to worker layoffs” (U.S. Department of
Labor, 2003a).2 The 2002 act broadens this definition in two ways.
First, the 2002 act merges the trade adjustment assistance program with its
previously separate cousin, the smaller NAFTA-TAA program, and uses the more
expansive NAFTA-TAA basis for eligibility. Secondary workers at an affected firm’s
upstream suppliers and downstream customers who are indirectly affected by trade
may now be eligible for TAA. The inclusion of these secondary workers in TAA is
expected to increase the number of certified workers from 130,000 to 180,000
(Congressional Budget Office, 2002). The inclusion of workers laid off in plant
relocations is expected to increase certifications by an additional 20,000 workers.
To receive benefits, workers in certified firms must show a decline of at least

2

In a 1988 amendment, Congress also extended eligibility to those who provided essential services to
companies adversely affected by trade. However, this extension was not implemented because the
import fee on which it was conditioned was never established (GAO/HRD-93-36 Dislocated Worker
Assistance Program).

Table 3
Program Features over Time
Trade Act
of 1974
Eligibility

Additional
requirements for
benefit receipt

None

Duration of cash
assistance
(excludes weeks
receiving
unemployment
insurance)
Training
Job search
allowances

52 weeks

Relocation
allowances

Health insurance

Additional
programs

None

1981–2001

Trade Act of 2002

Workers who can demonstrate
that “increased imports of
articles like or directly
competitive with articles
produced by the firm . . . have
‘contributed importantly’ to
both the layoffs and the
decline of sales or
production” (2000 Green
Book). In 1988, Congress
adds eligibility for natural gas
and oil drilling and
exploration workers. In 1993,
NAFTA-TAA covers workers
displaced by trade with
Canada and Mexico,
including secondary workers
and workers affected by plant
relocations.
Workers must actively
participate in job search
(1986) and complete
authorized training unless
specifically excused by the
Secretary of Labor (1988).
Training waivers are not
possible in NAFTA-TAA.
52 weeks (Workers participating
in authorized training may
receive an additional 26
weeks of cash assistance.)

Includes not only primary, but also
upstream and downstream
workers displaced by increased
imports or due to a plant
relocating overseas. Includes
farmers who experience price
declines due to imports.

Workers must participate in job
search and training, but may
receive a waiver for up to six
months for the later if they meet
one of six criteria (the Secretary
of Labor has the discretion to
issue longer waivers).
78 weeks (Workers participating in
remedial education are eligible
for an additional 26 weeks of
cash assistance.)

Up to 104 weeks
Up to 104 weeks
Grants not to exceed the lesser of 90 percent of costs or $800 per
beneficiary (raised to $1,250 in the Trade Act of 2002). Recipients
must apply within the later of one year of certification (or last
complete layoff) or within six months of completing training.
The lesser of 90 percent of relocation expenses and three times the
worker’s average weekly wage or $800 per beneficiary (raised to
$1,250 in the Trade Act of 2002). Applicants must apply within 14
months of TAA certification (or last complete layoff) or within six
months of completing training (whichever is later) and must have
a job offer at the time of application.
None
Refundable/advanceable tax credit
for 65 percent of health
insurance costs can be used to
purchase COBRA, individual
health insurance, coverage
through a spouse’s plan (if the
employer subsidizes less than 50
percent of the cost) or a state
insurance pool.
Supplemental Wage Allowance
Alternative Trade Adjustment
Demonstration (1988)
Assistance (five-year
demonstration)
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20 percent in wages or hours and must enroll in training. The Congressional
Budget Office estimates that 30 percent of these certified workers will eventually
draw TAA benefits. This represents a significant increase from the 23 percent seen
in 2001, in part because of likely increases in take-up in response to the increased
generosity of the program.
Second, for the first time farmers are now eligible for trade adjustment
assistance. This part of the program, administered by the U.S. Department of
Agriculture, is eligible for appropriations of up to $90 million per year. Farmers
with average adjusted gross income less than $2.5 million are eligible for free
technical assistance and for up to $10,000 of cash assistance (per year) when both
the price of the commodity they produce is 20 percent less than the national
average over the last five years and increases in imports contributed importantly to
this decline (USDA, 2003).3
Cash Benefits
Benefits for TAA recipients have been expanded along many dimensions. First,
workers may now receive cash benefits for up to 78 weeks if they continue to be
enrolled in training, rather than 52, in addition to the 26 weeks of unemployment
insurance they may receive. The size of the cash benefit remains the same as that
under unemployment insurance. Those enrolled in remedial education can receive
an additional 26 weeks of benefits, for a total of 130 weeks of cash assistance.
While workers are still required to receive training to receive cash assistance,
it may now be easier to waive that requirement. Training costs for the program are
capped at $220 million per year, double the previous combined TAA and NAFTATAA funding level.4 Workers are eligible for higher job search allowances and
relocation allowances, as well as the benefits available to other unemployed workers
under the Workforce Investment Act of 1998.
Alternative Trade Adjustment Assistance for Older Workers: Wage Allowances
Typically, trade adjustment assistance cash payments end when workers take
new jobs. As in unemployment insurance, the rationale for this structure of benefits
is that workers need assistance only until they begin to earn wages again (insurance
against unexpected loss in wages). One negative consequence of this insurance
structure is that it dulls the incentive to find employment quickly or to accept a job
with lower wages. In 1988, a supplemental wage demonstration project intended to
add incentives for quick reemployment, even at lower wages, was authorized by
3
Funds permitting, the USDA’s Farm Service Agency will provide assistance “equal to the product of the
amount of the commodity produced in the most recent marketing year multiplied by one-half the
difference between an amount equal to 80 percent of the average of the national average prices of the
commodity for the 5 marketing years preceding the most recent marketing year and the national
average price of the commodity for the most recent marketing year” (USDA, 2003). However, the sum
of counter cyclical payments and TAA payments may not exceed $65,000.
4
Other government funds may be used for training when TAA’s training funds are exhausted.
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Congress as part of the amendments to trade adjustment assistance, although no
states seem to have implemented the demonstration.
The 2002 act includes a provision for similar wage allowances. Certain workers
age 50 or older are eligible for a new pilot program, Alternative Trade Adjustment
Assistance (ATAA), that would provide them with cash benefits equal to 50 percent
of the difference between their old salary and their new salary (capped at $10,000
total), health care assistance for up to two years and the standard relocation
allowance (if applicable) in lieu of regular TAA benefits if they are reemployed
within 26 weeks of separation at lower wages and earn less than $50,000 in their new
job (U.S. Department of Labor, 2003b). The goal of this program is to insure
workers against lower reemployment wages while encouraging them to find reemployment relatively quickly (within 26 weeks). A worker group must apply specifically for ATAA when filing its TAA petition. Some of the eligibility criteria include
that the petitioning group have a “significant” number of workers over age 50, that
the workers possess skills that are “not easily transferable” and that “competitive
conditions within [the] industry are adverse” (Department of Labor, 2003c).5 Once
the U.S. Department of Labor certifies a group as eligible for TAA and ATAA, those
eligible for ATAA have the option of applying for ATAA or TAA.
Health Insurance Credits
Recipients of trade adjustment assistance are eligible to receive an uncapped
refundable advanceable tax credit to pay up to 65 percent of their health care
premiums.6 This tax credit is essentially a voucher for the purchase of health
insurance (since, as described below, it does not depend on the amount of taxes
owed and can be used to offset the cost of health insurance whenever it is
purchased) and may be used in several ways. For example, under the Consolidated
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA), workers leaving a job may
continue to purchase their old employer-sponsored health insurance plan for up to
18 months, and the new credit can be used toward this purchase. The credit can
also be used to continue individual insurance that the worker had had for more
than 30 days before dislocation, to pay for coverage through a spouse or to
participate in a state insurance pool. This provision represents a significant increase
in the value of benefits available to workers. The average annual group health
insurance premium for a family of four is around $5,500 (Gruber, 2000). The
health credit thus represents more than 30 percent of the cash benefit the average

5

The fact that such benefits are available only to older workers who work in firms with many other older
workers makes an odd distinction between firms with heterogeneous workers and those with homogeneous workers. The Department of Labor is interpreting “a significant number of workers” as the lesser
of 50 workers or 5 percent of the affected workers (in firms with fewer than 50 trade impacted workers
at least three must be 50 or older), as explained in DOL (2003c).
6
These provisions for assistance in purchasing health insurance will also apply to a broader set of
workers, including some steel industry retirees and other Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation
recipients not eligible for Medicare.
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TAA recipient would receive (65 percent of $5,500 per year is $70 per week, and the
average cash benefit was $222 per week in 2001).
Trade Adjustment Assistance for Firms and Communities
Separate TAA benefits continue to be available for firms and communities, but
these programs are small. The firm program for trade adjustment assistance is
minimally funded, at $16 million annually (although this represents an increase
from the $11 million budget for 1999). While the Community Adjustment and
Investment Program continues to provide assistance based on previous awards, it
has not accepted new grant applications since 2001, no new funds were appropriated in 2002, and the program was not included in the 2003 budget.

Preliminary Evidence and Expectations
Because workers have only been eligible for the new TAA benefits since
November 2002 (and some benefits did not phase in until 2003) and because of the
broad scope of the changes, there is little direct evidence on the effect of the recent
program changes on take-up, duration of unemployment, reemployment wages,
labor markets or health care markets. However, evidence from past studies of TAA
and of unemployment insurance offer some evidence about what to expect.
Effects on Individual Unemployment Spells
Increasing the length of time that trade adjustment assistance benefits are
available could increase the length of time that the average worker is unemployed.
There is a well-documented spike in the likelihood of an unemployed worker
becoming reemployed at 26 weeks—that is, when unemployment benefits expire
(Katz and Meyer, 1990a). Card and Levine (2000) find that extending unemployment benefits by 13 weeks increases the average number of weeks of unemployment
by one week, and others have found an even greater sensitivity (for example, Katz
and Meyer, 1990a). With the Trade Adjustment Assistance Reform Act of 2002
extending benefits by 26 weeks, the duration of benefit receipt and unemployment
spells may significantly rise for affected workers.7
Making benefits more generous may both increase take-up and increase the
duration of unemployment. Anderson and Meyer (1997) find an elasticity of
take-up with respect to benefit generosity of around 0.5 or higher in the unemployment insurance program. Estimates also suggest that more generous benefits
lengthen unemployment spells, with a 10-percentage-point increase in generosity
leading to an increase in duration of as much as one week or more (Meyer, 1996).
7
Note that newly covered secondary workers were suddenly eligible for two years of benefits and thus
faced a much larger change in incentives. For a small subset of recipients as discussed below, however,
the ATAA experiment may provide modest incentives for faster reemployment.
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Applying evidence from unemployed workers in general to workers receiving
trade adjustment assistance is problematic, since TAA workers have different employment and demographic profiles from the average unemployed worker. Gibbons and Katz (1991) find that workers displaced by plant closings are less likely to
face the same stigma as other unemployed workers, for example, so some trade
adjustment assistance workers may fare better upon reemployment. In addition,
TAA requires (most) workers to get training during this period, imposing a cost on
continuing to get benefits that is not faced by most unemployment insurance
recipients.8 Despite these caveats, the increase in generosity of benefits for TAA
recipients is so large that both take-up and duration seem bound to increase. Even
if TAA recipients value the health insurance credit at only 50 percent of the actual
expenditure on premiums, the credit alone could increase take-up by 10 percent
and average duration by half a week. With 70,000 more workers potentially eligible
for TAA, increases in take-up and duration make the program even costlier, as
reflected in the Congressional Budget Office (2002) estimates.
Effects on Reemployment Wages
Are these potentially longer spells of unemployment helpful to workers, allowing them to wait for the best job match available, or are they detrimental, allowing
skills to erode and reducing reemployment wages? The evidence suggests that a
longer spell of unemployment does not lead to a better job match. For example,
Meyer (1995) reviews a series of “reemployment bonus” experiments (in which
workers were offered bonuses to find jobs more quickly) and finds that workers
offered such bonuses did find jobs more quickly, but not at the expense of lower
reemployment wages. Workers may also be harmed by long unemployment spells
through stigmatization or through skill atrophy (Blanchard and Diamond, 1994;
Pissarides, 1992). Addison and Portugal (1989) find that a 10 percent increase in
the duration of unemployment may lower reemployment wages by 1 percent.
Decker and Corson (1995) find that the training provided through trade adjustment assistance does not seem to increase reemployment wages. While Marcal
(2001) also fails to find evidence that training increased reemployment wages, she
finds some evidence that trainees had higher employment rates relative to recipients not in training and to those who have exhausted unemployment insurance
benefits.9
Because of the new wage allowance program, older workers face a distinct set
of incentives when choosing a new job. The new wage allowance program provides
8
Black, Smith, Berger and Noel (2003) review the evidence on the effect of unemployment insurance
“profiling,” where the recipients of unemployment insurance who are projected to have the longest
insured unemployment spells are required to get job search assistance. The threat of this requirement
(rather than the services themselves) seems to reduce duration, suggesting that the training required of
trade adjustment assistance recipients may serve to reduce their spells, as well.
9
There is some limited evidence that older individuals’ reemployment wages are higher because of
unemployment insurance (Ehrenberg and Oaxaca, 1976).
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lower benefits to workers whose new wages are higher, which works like a tax on
seeking out the highest-paying job. Because the benefit is only available to workers
reemployed within 26 weeks, it may encourage workers to become reemployed
more quickly, but it also provides incentives only in a narrow band around week 26.
It may also dull workers’ incentives to seek out the highest-paying job available. The
eligibility cutoff of reemployment wages of less than $50,000 creates enormous
implicit tax rates in that region. For example, an ATAA-eligible worker who used to
earn $60,000 but is reemployed at $40,000 would be eligible for $10,000 in wage
insurance. The same worker reemployed at $50,000 would be eligible for nothing—a 100 percent tax rate from this program alone. A useful research project will
be to study how older workers react to these incentives.
Effects on Firm Decisions
Firm decisions may also be affected by the expansion of the program. One
well-documented problem with the unemployment insurance system is that firms
may game the system through temporary layoff and recall of workers (Anderson,
1993). For example, firms may lay off workers seasonally and let unemployment
insurance pay them for part of the year, because the unemployment insurance
taxes paid by many firms are not adequately “experience rated”—these firms pay
less in taxes than their workers receive in benefits for each of these layoffs. Katz and
Meyer (1990b) find a spike in recalls at 26 weeks, suggesting that firms time recalls
to correspond with workers’ exhaustion of unemployment benefits. Imperfect
experience rating may account for 20 to 50 percent of temporary layoffs (Topel,
1984; Card and Levine, 1994), with manufacturing receiving the biggest net unemployment insurance subsidies through temporary layoffs (Anderson and Meyer,
1993; Meyer and Rosenbaum, 1996).
Because trade adjustment assistance requires firms to demonstrate a decline in
employment due to trade, it may be less subject to this kind of moral hazard. Also,
as discussed above, TAA workers are less likely to be recalled to their original
employers than are other unemployed workers. That said, firms may be less likely
to offer generous severance packages (and workers may be less likely to flee
declining industries) because of the increased generosity of TAA benefits.
Effects on Health Markets
The addition of the health care credit is perhaps the biggest structural change
in the trade adjustment assistance program and could serve as a pilot program for
health insurance tax credits for a broader segment of the population. Take-up of
the health care credit is likely to be high, since it can be used for insurance from
a wide variety of sources. The fact that it is “refundable” means that workers who
owe no taxes will still be able to use the full credit amount (because if the credit
amount is larger than a worker’s tax bill, the difference is refunded for use toward
insurance premiums), and the fact that it is “advanceable” means that workers will
not have to wait until they file taxes to use the credit (since it can be used to pay
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an insurance premium at the time the insurance is purchased). While an advanceable credit alleviates concerns about unemployed workers’ liquidity constraints, it
also dramatically increases the complexity of administering the program. Overall,
the credit is equivalent to a voucher for the purchase of health insurance.
This health insurance credit may affect other aspects of the health insurance
market, including the individual health insurance market and the presence of state
high-risk pools. The rationale for subsidizing the purchase of individual insurance
only when such insurance had been purchased more than 30 days before the layoff
occurred is to discourage firms (and workers) from discontinuing coverage immediately before layoffs and to discourage individuals from moving from employersponsored insurance to the individual health insurance market. That said, the
ability to use the credit in the individual market seems likely to increase participation. Subsidies to encourage people to join state insurance pools may help states
establish such pools. Thirty states currently offer high-risk pools, designed to
provide coverage to people with medical conditions that make private individual
insurance particularly expensive for them. States that do not already have such
pools for those without health insurance are being encouraged to create them
through Department of Health and Human Services grants (and subsidies to offset
partially the losses that the pools incur). The Congressional Budget Office (2002)
expects that half of the states without high-risk pools will use this opportunity to
establish them.

Discussion
Smoothing transitions for trade-displaced workers can help to make international trade closer to a true Pareto improvement. Moreover, trade adjustment
assistance could facilitate the passage of international agreements to liberalize
trade. Indeed, the small size of the program in the past—for example, trade
adjustment assistance in 2000 covered less than 1 percent of the unemployed and
had a budget less than 2 percent of the unemployment compensation program
(U.S. Department of Commerce, 2002, Tables 416 and 593)—suggested that its role
was more one of political expedience than of vital importance to structural adjustment. Like any program, trade adjustment assistance must face political realities.
That said, the current incarnation of TAA falls short of the ideal program in several
important ways, and the expansions of 2002 dramatically increase the program’s
potential to affect labor and health markets more broadly.
First and foremost, it is not clear why a program should single out workers
adversely affected by international trade, rather than providing retraining and
income support to all workers in shrinking sectors or even all unemployed workers.
Increased import competition accounted for only 1.5 percent of separations due to
mass layoffs in the late 1990s (Irwin, 2002, p. 100, from Bureau of Labor Statistics
data). The expansion of TAA benefits in 2002 to upstream and downstream
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secondary workers highlights the inherent arbitrariness of drawing a sharp eligibility line based on something that has such diffuse effects as trade. In fact,
policymakers on both sides of the aisle have proposed replacing trade adjustment
assistance with a broader program (such as the dislocated worker program proposed in the 1994 Reemployment Act) or consolidating it with existing worker
assistance programs (such as proposed inclusion in the 1998 Workforce Investment
Act).
Second, the particular parameters of the program may not be desirable.
Providing income support for unemployed workers for as long as two and a half
years may decrease their work prospects more than the extra training they get
increases them. Requiring all workers to receive training to receive income support
may encourage workers to get training they do not need or value. The nonlinear
structure built into the wage insurance option creates the kind of cliffs that are
likely to induce significant distortions. The health insurance benefit exacerbates
these incentive problems and presents serious administrative challenges.
We believe that a more flexible structural adjustment program would meet the
economic goals of the current TAA program while minimizing the distortions that
the program creates. The current program expansions have the laudable feature of
addressing many different costs of dislocation in a coordinated framework, but the
substantial constraints imposed by the structure of the benefits undermine the
program’s efficiency and undermine its potential to address structural adjustment
costs more broadly. The ideal program would give workers more control over the
resources available to them and make the size of those resources less dependent on
extended unemployment spells. Making the program more flexible in this way
could both reduce administrative costs and improve worker outcomes by mitigating
adverse incentives and maximizing the program’s impact.10
One way to create such flexibility would be to create “adjustment accounts” for
workers, who could then allocate the funds as they saw fit between income support,
job training, wage allowances, child care, health insurance and so on. These
accounts could be available to all unemployed workers or to unemployed workers
in shrinking sectors—not limited to those manufacturing workers categorized as
adversely affected by trade. Imposing lifetime limits on the availability of the
accounts to workers could minimize gaming by employers and workers. Workers
could choose the combination of benefits best tailored to their circumstances. If
policymakers are concerned that workers may spend down the accounts too
quickly, relying on the availability of support from other government programs,
withdrawals from the account could be limited in size and eligibility for other
programs could be determined jointly. Allowing workers to make these decisions

10

The Firm TAA program serves as example of the costliness of centralized decision making about the
use of flexible funds. In its evaluation of the Firm TAA program, the Urban Institute (1998) found that
only 55 percent of the program funds went to firm assistance, with much of the rest devoted to the very
involved certification process.
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would relieve the Department of Labor of its role in policing program recipients’
participation in training and other requirements, while aligning recipients’ incentives with the reemployment goals of the program. No doubt this would make the
program more attractive to workers and would likely increase take-up. This increase
in program size would have to be balanced against the increase in efficiency and the
redistribution it would entail.
Choosing the right program parameters within this more flexible system
requires estimates of several key elasticities, such as the effect of longer benefits on
unemployment duration and reemployment wages for recipients of benefits, recipients’ valuation of health insurance credits and so on. The Trade Adjustment
Assistance Reform Act of 2002 will generate a substantial natural experiment, both
because the changes in the program are substantial and because those already
receiving such benefits before the legislative change must continue under the rules
of the previous program for the next two years. The new elements of the program
may serve as a trial for the broader use of wage insurance and health insurance tax
credits. Studying this experience may provide information about how workers
respond to adjustment assistance and may enable the creation of more efficient
programs in the future.

y The authors thank Patty Anderson, Alan Durell, Doug Holtz-Eakin, Doug Irwin, Larry
Katz and Michael Murray for numerous helpful comments and discussions. Baicker served as
Senior Economist and Rehavi as Research Assistant at the Council of Economic Advisers in
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